Steyn doesn't pull any punches, does he? He's correct, of course. All the "hearts and minds" policies are complete drivel. We cannot rebuild primitive Afghanistan, and shouldn't waste our resources in such a futile attempt.
He's also correct in stating that we haven't waged war to win since the second World War. Too many American lives and ridiculously large piles of American money have been squandered in far-away slapfests.
There are too many money quotes to post here; the article isn't that long, and you'll be glad you savored every drop.
Eight months after Petraeus announced his latest folly, the Afghan Local Police initiative, Oxfam reported that the newly formed ALP was a hotbed of torture and pederasty. Almost every Afghan institution is, of course.
At the dawn of the so-called American era, Washington chose to downplay U.S. hegemony and instead created and funded transnational institutions in which the non-imperial superpower was so self-deprecating it artificially inflated everybody else’s status in a kind of geopolitical affirmative-action program. In the military sphere, this meant NATO. --- The 2004 NATO summit was hailed as a landmark success after the alliance’s 26 members agreed to commit an extra 600 troops and three helicopters. That averages out at 23.08 troops per country, plus almost a ninth of a helicopter apiece. Half a decade of quagmire later, Washington was investing even larger amounts of diplomatic effort failing to rouse its allies into the most perfunctory gestures of non-combat pantywaist transnationalism: We know that, under ever more refined rules of engagement, certain allies won’t go out at night, or in snow, or in provinces where there’s fighting going on, so, by the 2010 NATO confab, Robert Gates was reduced to complaining that the allies’ promised 450 “trainers” for the Afghan National Army had failed to materialize. Supposedly 46 nations are contributing to the allied effort in Afghanistan, so that would work out at ten “trainers” per country. Imagine if the energy expended in these ridiculous (and in some cases profoundly damaging) transnational fig leaves had been directed into more quaintly conventional channels — like, say, identifying America’s national interest and pursuing it.
I knew it was bad but didn't know it was *that* bad. I've been waffling on my feelings about this whole Afghan mess and was infuriated with Karzai's latest rant against us. I knew there had been one or possibly two murders of our soldiers by Afghans but was pretty stunned when Mark laid out how often this has happened and the cavalier reaction to it. WTH?!? He wrote that Vietnam is so ingrained in our national psyche that we can no longer even recognize the value of war. I think he's right.
At a certain level, credible deterrence depends on a credible enemy. The Soviet Union disintegrated, but the surviving superpower’s instinct to de-escalate intensified: In Kirkuk as in Kandahar, every Lilliputian warlord quickly grasped that you could provoke the infidel Gulliver with relative impunity. Mutually Assured Destruction had curdled into Massively Applied Desultoriness.
I sure appreciate his writing talents, even when covering a topic as painful as this one. Like lady red says, you savor every drop. I don't know what to think anymore about our role in the ME.
Steyn doesn't pull any punches, does he? He's correct, of course. All the "hearts and minds" policies are complete drivel. We cannot rebuild primitive Afghanistan, and shouldn't waste our resources in such a futile attempt.
ReplyDeleteHe's also correct in stating that we haven't waged war to win since the second World War. Too many American lives and ridiculously large piles of American money have been squandered in far-away slapfests.
There are too many money quotes to post here; the article isn't that long, and you'll be glad you savored every drop.
Eight months after Petraeus announced his latest folly, the Afghan Local Police initiative, Oxfam reported that the newly formed ALP was a hotbed of torture and pederasty. Almost every Afghan institution is, of course.
ReplyDeleteGood lord almighty.
At the dawn of the so-called American era, Washington chose to downplay U.S. hegemony and instead created and funded transnational institutions in which the non-imperial superpower was so self-deprecating it artificially inflated everybody else’s status in a kind of geopolitical affirmative-action program. In the military sphere, this meant NATO.
ReplyDelete---
The 2004 NATO summit was hailed as a landmark success after the alliance’s 26 members agreed to commit an extra 600 troops and three helicopters. That averages out at 23.08 troops per country, plus almost a ninth of a helicopter apiece. Half a decade of quagmire later, Washington was investing even larger amounts of diplomatic effort failing to rouse its allies into the most perfunctory gestures of non-combat pantywaist transnationalism: We know that, under ever more refined rules of engagement, certain allies won’t go out at night, or in snow, or in provinces where there’s fighting going on, so, by the 2010 NATO confab, Robert Gates was reduced to complaining that the allies’ promised 450 “trainers” for the Afghan National Army had failed to materialize. Supposedly 46 nations are contributing to the allied effort in Afghanistan, so that would work out at ten “trainers” per country. Imagine if the energy expended in these ridiculous (and in some cases profoundly damaging) transnational fig leaves had been directed into more quaintly conventional channels — like, say, identifying America’s national interest and pursuing it.
I knew it was bad but didn't know it was *that* bad. I've been waffling on my feelings about this whole Afghan mess and was infuriated with Karzai's latest rant against us. I knew there had been one or possibly two murders of our soldiers by Afghans but was pretty stunned when Mark laid out how often this has happened and the cavalier reaction to it. WTH?!? He wrote that Vietnam is so ingrained in our national psyche that we can no longer even recognize the value of war. I think he's right.
At a certain level, credible deterrence depends on a credible enemy. The Soviet Union disintegrated, but the surviving superpower’s instinct to de-escalate intensified: In Kirkuk as in Kandahar, every Lilliputian warlord quickly grasped that you could provoke the infidel Gulliver with relative impunity. Mutually Assured Destruction had curdled into Massively Applied Desultoriness.
ReplyDeleteI sure appreciate his writing talents, even when covering a topic as painful as this one. Like lady red says, you savor every drop. I don't know what to think anymore about our role in the ME.
(sorry to have so many comments in a row but I just kept finding more to agree with)
ReplyDelete