LEWY
- I have read the article and,
unfortunately, I have no abilities in Hungarian nor have I been able to find
anything other than very short excerpts of Orban’s speech in English, which leaves
me unable to directly compare author Professor Gati of Johns Hopkins’ take to
what Orban actually said. However, I am
reasonably familiar with Orban and his political party, the massively-popular
Fidesz, as well as with Hungary’s second-most popular political party, the
nationalist Jobbik. Having lived in
Austria, which even today retains very, very strong links with its former
Imperial partner, helps as well.
First, the
article confirms my central point that only the particular sort of
globalist-progressive democracy is ideologically acceptable to the U.S. and the
EU, with USG being the driving force behind this ideological movement. Note that the author sets forth quite clearly
that so long as Orban followed the advice of the EU and the U.S. Embassy and
was praised by the New York Times, he was legitimate; now that he has rejected
those, he is not, despite the fact that he represents the democratically-elected
will of over two-thirds of the Hungarian people. When USG/EU ideologues use the word “democracy”
it does not mean votes or elections, but the adherence to the current
international system, which I like to describe in Walter Russel Mead-ian terms
as Hamiltonian-Wilsonianism on steroids.
The article
itself is quite laughable on its face. From the 7th Grade Journalism
class clever headline to ridiculous appeals to authority such as the Professor’s
snark that “[i]f an American undergraduate had submitted such a long-winded and
pretentious paper for an introductory course on international relations, his
grade would have been an “F.” I seriously
doubt, given the rampant dishonesty of the professoriate, especially those
employed at private diploma mills, that the professor has given anyone an “F”
ever, but to presume to grade based on knowing what is best for Hungarians more
than their elected leader is ridiculous.
On the
subject matter at hand, I think it’s obvious to everyone outside the
ideological bubble what has happened here.
In the eurphoria following the collapse of Communism and the re-birth of
a real Hungarian nation, there was a lot of appreciation there for the support
of the U.S. and the EU and membership in the EU was seen as a recognition that
they had left the Second World behind and had re-taken their rightful place in
the mainstream of Europe.
However, as
the years passed and the Hungarians became more aware of what the ideological
component of the EU means in practice, for them at the street-level, opposition
has arisen. As they have witnessed other EU powers and the U.S. strongly
financially and politically support those Hungarians in the minority (that is,
those who support neither Fidesz nor Jobbik and are broadly supportive of the
EU project, including its ideological dimension) and insist they have a seat at
decision-making tables in the name of civil society involvement, they have soured
on much of the project.
Key—absolutely
key—to this growing divide between ordinary Hungarians, their elected leaders
and the U.S./EU and its supported civil-society groups is the issue of the
gypsies. Or the “Roma” as our new
leaders insist on calling them. I could
pile superlatives for hours and still would not reach the level of contempt
Hungarians have for gypsies. And for good
reason; just their abuse and exploitation of children alone places them
well-outside the norms of civilized conduct.
As Orban
stated in his speech, what he means by “illiberal” as opposed to liberal
democracy is that Hungary wishes to “build a
workfare society ... which is willing to bear the odium to declare that it is
not liberal in character. . . .while of course respecting the values of
Christianity, freedom and human rights, once again make the Hungarian community
competitive." And, most
significantly: "The
Hungarian nation is not a mere pile of individuals but a community
which needs to be organized, strengthened and built.”
In other words, Hungary is not
EU Administrative Region Nineteen, but a nation of, by and for the Hungarian
people, as a nation, and the U.S. and EU’s insistance that Roma/gypsies be
treated as part of that nation on the basis of citizenship and passport-holding
offends their sense of who they are, who controls their destiny and where they
are going.
Orban is
right in observing that the globalist-progessive version of liberal democracy
sees people are nothing more than piles of individuals. California is California if it is filled with
50 million European-Americans or 50 million Mexican-Americans; there cannot and
will not be any suggestion otherwise. Same with Sweden, Norway, the UK and, yes, Hungary.
No doubt
there are other reasons for his judgment, such as the sacrifice of fellow
Orthodox Serbs in the interests of largely-criminal Muslim Albanians in Kosovo,
the fellow-feeling with the “stonger horse” Russia in the larger conflict, but
I think that is the key.
This is the
use of nationalism: to protect one’s
people, language, culture from replacement or disappearance by demands that those things are mere
knick-knacks on the nation’s shelf and that all other things and people have an
equal demand to a place at the national table and an equal say in the affairs of
the nation-state. Because a particular
form of nationalism—the national socialism of Germany during a specific time
period—involved as a necessary adjunct hatred for those others to the point of
killing them no more discredits the value of nationalism than doctors who think
they have the duty and right to euthenize terminally ill patients discredits
the value of medicine. Like many
concepts, nationalism is fraught with danger, but this fact does not say
anything about its necessity. Violence
itself is the ultimate danger, yet the police man carries a gun, and with good
reason.
Russians
reject post-nationalism in the case of Russia, Jews reject it in the case of Israel,
Japan rejects it in the case of Japan, the Muslim world writ-large rejects it in the case of the Ummah, and Hungary is no different in that regard.
Great post Jourdan. Where do you think all of this will lead? Much of the world is a tinderbox waiting to explode, isn't it?
ReplyDeleteJourdan,
ReplyDeleteThanks for replying at length.
You're quite correct that the EU has some fairly narrow constraints for political parties - the famous cordon sanitaire. Oblan is clearly outside that. It doesn't take much; Berlusconi was ousted summarily by Mario Draghi, the ECB president, when he dared invoke too much sovereignty.
The EU is a peculiar sort of Empire; a self organizing society of Mandarins without an actual Emperor. Everyone instinctively knows where the center of gravity is, and takes care not to wander too far off the reservation. Everyone who cares to be part of the Empire, that is.
And Empires have their attractions - always have, for the last five thousand years or so.
I have to disagree with these passages:
Because a particular form of nationalism—the national socialism of Germany during a specific time period—involved as a necessary adjunct hatred for those others to the point of killing them no more discredits the value of nationalism than doctors who think they have the duty and right to euthenize terminally ill patients discredits the value of medicine.
War and horror has attended nationalism virtually since the beginning of the Westphalian nation-state. As I replied to Matt - forget about 1939, what about 1914? The modern wariness with nationalism predates Hitler; All Quiet on the Western Front was written by a German, and Hitler banned that book.
Like many concepts, nationalism is fraught with danger, but this fact does not say anything about its necessity. Violence itself is the ultimate danger, yet the police man carries a gun, and with good reason.
Yes, and the policeman is the agent of the Hegemon. Who will play that role in a Europe of Nations? And isn't such a role incompatible with Nationalism?
What sovereign right is more fundamental than the recourse to violence? ("Ultima Ratio Regum" being the motto of my namesake, Louis XIV).
The analogy with free people and their right to bear arms goes only so far - yes, free people are armed. The state does not possess a monopoly on violence, but a monopoly on the legitimacy of violence. One has to answer to the sovereign and defend ones actions ("better to be tried by twelve than buried by six".)
So even in a land where the second Amendment was truly honored, the state has a role to play.
Who will decide the legitimacy of violence in a Europe of Nations? (Historically this had an answer - the Pope. I'm not sure you'll like that answer. When this broke down, there was the Thirty Years War, and then the Westphalian treaty, etc... and then there was no arbiter.)
I have to say, the more I think about it... the more the idea of a world of powerful, dynamic and (yes) cosmopolitain city states embedded in an empire or three seems a more stable vision for the future of the world. It's also more in line with the world historical norm pre-Westphalia. I know it's an anathema for you, but it doesn't mean the end of nations, just the end of their ability to run a state for their own ends.
Don't hold me to that - I recognize the downside and I'm open to other ideas - but at the very least I think you (and many other proponents of nationalism) are seriously downplaying the risks.